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ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF
CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS UNDER SECTION 5(a)
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
INTRODUCTION

The second half of the Twentieth Century has found private enterprise shocked into the realization that violations of
the antitrust laws are not "minor" violations, "technical" infractions involving no wrongdoing, or merely "white collar" offenses 1
whose penalties are to be absorbed in the costs of doing business.
The success of the Department of Justice in convicting twentynine corporations and forty-five executives, (seven of whom
served prison sentences), in the Electrical Equipment Industry
antitrust litigation in 19602 and the avalanche of multimillion
dollar treble damage suits that followed 3emphasize
the vulnerability of the business community to the double edged sword of the
antitrust laws.'
The primary purpose of the penal provisions of the antitrust laws is to punish offenders and to deter others from future
violations.5 To effectuate this purpose, these laws provide the
government with machinery for seeking injunctive relief6 and
I United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167,
170 (S.D. N.Y. 1955). In 1955, Congress increased the potential penalties
for each violation of the Sherman Act from $5,000 to $50,000, Sherman Act,
§1, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1964) amending 26 Stat. 209 (1890), because "in the popular mind the amount of the penalty is likely to bear a relationship to the
gravity of the offense, and so a small fine may indicate that the offense for
which it was levied is not very serious with the result that some businessmen may consider the possibility of viofation a good business risk." S. REP.
No. 618, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955). Several proposals have been made
since the Electrical Industry criminal cases in 1960 to further strengthen
the penalties for violation of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., S. 2252, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1962) which proposed to increase the Sherman Act penalties from $50,000 to $100,000; and on a second conviction within ten years of
the first fine would be up to $500,000 for corporate defendants and up
to $100,000 plus up to one year in prison for individuals.
2 See generally for discussion of the criminal proceedings in the Electrical Industry cases Watkins, ElectricalEquipment Anti-Trust Cases - Their
Implicationsfor dovernment and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1961).
3For discussion of pre-trial procedural innovations implemented to
handle these civil cases, consult Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment
Anti-Trust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964).
4See,
e.g., La Hazeltine v. Zenith Radio Corp., Civil No. 59C. 1847 (N.D.
Ill. 1966) (appeal pending) (an original damage award against La Hazeltine
on an antitrust counterclaim amounted to over $48,000,000).
5The following antitrust laws provide criminal sanctions for violations
thereof: Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1-3, §8 (1964) ; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§24 (1964); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §13a
(1964) (Borah-Van Nuys Discrimination in Rebates Act).
6 Sherman Act §4, 15 U.S.C. §4 (1964) ; Clayton Act §15, 15 U.S.C. §25
(1964). It is significant to note that section 16 of the Clayton Act grants
an injunctive remedy to "[alny person, firm, corporation, or association
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws....
15 U.S.C. §26 (1964).
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even damages against infringing defendants.,
Congress has
also provided an important supplementary source of antitrust

enforcement through. Section 4 of the Clayton Act,8 which per-

mits injured private claimants to sue for treble damages, 9 thereby
facilitating the use of "private self-interest as a means of en-

forcement of the antitrust laws."10
In order to recover under Section 4, the private suitor

has to prove: (1) a specific violation .of the anti-trust laws, (2),
direct injury to his business or property by reason of such violation, and (3) actual damages. 1 Recognizing the burdens resting on private suitors to prove their claims,'2 Congress enacted
Section 5 of the Clayton Act,13 making available under certain
circumstances, the evidentiary benefit of "matters" previously
established by the government in antitrust actions successfully
7 Clayton Act §4A, 15 U.S.C. §15(a)

(1964), amending 38 Stat. 731, §4

(1914) (allows government to.recover actual damages sustained by reason
of an antitrust violation, but not treble, damages).
815 U.S.C. §15 (1964). This treble damage provision was originally
embodied in Section 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), repealed by
69 Stat. 283, §3 (1955), but was restricted in operation to violations of that
particular Act. Section 4 of the Clayton Act' 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964) as enacted, applied generally to "the antitrust laws," and thus superseded section
7. Section 4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
9 Congress has rarely authorized 'private treble damage actions. Section 4 is one of only three federal statutory provisions which provide for
mandatory treble damage recovery. This rarity emphasizes the importance
attached by Congress to effective antitrust enforcement.
10 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965). This purpose was articulated by Congress in
1955:

The damages of 'persons' are treble so that private persons will be
encouraged to bring actions which, though brought to enforce a private
claim, will nonetheless serve the public interest in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
"1E.g., Talon Inc. v. Union Slide Fastener Inc., 266 F. 2d 731, 736 (9th
Cir. 1959). For discussion and collection of cases, consult Pollack, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57
Nw. U. L. REv. 691 (1963) and Timberlake, Legal Injury Requirements and
Proof of Damages in Treble Actions Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 30 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 231 (1961).
12 See 51 CONG. REC. 13851 (1914). (remarks-of Senator Walsh) : "We all
know that the private individual is always at a disadvantage. He is never
armed with the means at his command to cope with these great organizations; and that was the very reason why this act was passed - - -...

"

See

also id. at 15825 (remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 16046 (remarks of
Senator Norris). The government, on the other hand, had the means at its
disposal (e.g., grand juries, power of subpoena and discovery and nationwide investigatory agencies) to seek out and detect violations which the
private litigant did not. For a discussion of the burdens of private suitors
prior to 1914, see W. HAMILTON & I. TILL., ANTITRUST IN ACTION, 82-83
(TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940).
1 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §16(a) (1964).
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prosecuted by it. The current Section 5 (a), including its permanent exclusionary proviso, provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has
violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws or by the United States
under Section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under Section
15a of this title.14
As enacted in 1914, Section 5 contained a second "temporary"

proviso:
Provided further, This section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees rendered in criminal proceedings or suits in
equity, now pending, in which the taking of testimony has been commenced but has not been concluded, provided such judgments or
decrees are rendered before any further testimony is taken. 15
Furthermore, to enable and encourage the private suitor to

utilize the findings and judgment of the prior litigation in the
prosecution of his own suit, 16 Congress enacted a section tolling
the statute of limitations during the course of the government
litigation.'
14 Id.

As amended in 1955, Section 5 underwent no significant policy

changes. 69 Stat. 283, amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The amendment did
permit the United States to introduce prior judgments in its own private
damage actions, see note 7, supra. Organizationally, the prima facie rule
portion of the section was segregated and renamed Section 5(a), while the
tolling provision of Section 5, see note 16, infra, became Section 5 (b). The
temporary proviso was deleted, see text at note 15, infra. Also, some minor
changes in wording were accomplished to accord with the terminology of the
Federal Rules.
1538 Stat. 731 (1914).
This proviso was temporary in that its purpose
was to restrict the retroactive effect of Section 5 upon suits pending at the

time of enactment in 1914.

16 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 216
F. Supp. 507, 510 (D.N.J. 1963), aff'd, 332 F. 2d 346 (3rd Cir. 1964), aff'd,
381 U.S. 311 (1965).
17 Section 4B of the Clayton Act bars a private treble damage suit unless brought within four years after the cause of action arises. 15 U.S.C.
§15(b) (1964). Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act suspends the running of
this limitation period during the pendency of the government suit. Section
5(b) provides:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United
States to prevent, restrain, or punish violation of any of the antitrust
laws, but not including an action under section 4A, the running of the
statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising
under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained
of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof
and for one year thereafter: Provided, however . . . any action to en-

force such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced

either within the period of suspension or within four years after the
cause of action accrued.
In order for Section 5(b) to apply there must be a substantial identity of
subject matter and parties in the public and the private antitrust suits. Leh
v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965); Union Carbide & Carbon
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Armed with the incentive of recovering three times the
value of actual injuries suffered, and with the prima facie

benefit of "matters" previously litigated, injured parties were
equipped to go forth as an ancillary force to supplement the

Justice Department's enforcement of the antitrust laws. 18 However, the effectiveness of this "ancillary force" necessarily depends on the extent to which the private treble damage suitor
may rely on the prior criminal judgment 19 to establish the elements of his case.

It will, therefore, be the purpose of this

Comment to examine: (1) the applicability of the exclusionary
proviso to criminal judgments, i.e., whether pleas of guilty and
nolo contendere are to be considered as consent decrees within
the scope of the exclusionary proviso, (2) the variance between
the elements which the government must prove in a criminal
antitrust action and those which a private litigant must establish to prove his right to treble damages, and (3) the extent to
Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F. 2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801
(1962).
Although sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 5 are complementary and
should be construed together, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, id.
at 569, they are not wholly interdependent or coextensive. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 316-318
(1965). (In this decision, the Court held the limitation period for private
treble damage actions tolled by FTC proceedings against defendants to the
same extent and in the same circumstance as it is by actions of the Justice
Department. However, the Supreme Court withheld any opinion as to the
applicability of Section 5(a) to FTC proceedings. But see Carpenter v.
Central Arkansas Milk Producers, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.),
71817 (W.D. Ark. 1966), in which the court held an FTC order to be a civil
antitrust "decree" within the scope of Section 5(a) ; see note 19, infra.
In section 5(a) Congress was concerned with the narrow issue of the
use of judgments or decrees as prima-facie evidence in private suits, whereas
in Section 5(b), Congress meant to assist private litigants in obtaining all
the benefits they might cull from governmental antitrust actions:
It may be . . . that when it was enacted the tolling provision was a
logical backstop for the prima-facie evidence clause of §5a. But ... it
is certainly not restricted to that effect. . . . The Government's initial
action may aid the private litigant in a number of other ways. The
pleadings, transcripts of testimony, exhibits and documents are available
to him in most instances ....
Moreover, difficult questions of law may
be tested and definitely resolved before the private litigant enters the
fray. The greater resources and expertise of the Commission and its
staff render the private suitor a tremendous benefit aside from any value
he may derive from a judgment or decree ....
Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., supra at 58-59.
18 Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949,
950 (D.N.J. 1940).
19 Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act also provides prima facie effect to
judgments entered in civil suits brought by the government to enjoin violations of the antitrust laws, see text at note 6, supra. Significantly, in Carpenter v. Central Arkansas Milk Producers, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade
Cas.), 171817 at 82772 (W.D. Ark. 1966), the district judge held that an
FTC order qualifies as an antitrust "judgment or decree" under Section 5 (a),
and that "the proceedings resulting in such final order or decree is a proceeding in equity and a civil proceeding within the meaning of Section 5 (a)
and an adjudication of a violation of the Clayton Act." Accord, New Jersey
Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F. 2d 346, 359
(1964) (dictum) ; Contra, Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc., 295 F. 729, 732
(E.D. N.Y. 1923). See note 17, supra.

19671

Evidentiary Effect of CriminalJudgments under Clayton Act

115

which a prior criminal judgment may be used to establish the
elements which must be proven in the subsequent private treble
damage action, particularly where the criminal judgment is entered on a plea of guilty.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS UNDER SECTION 5

(a)

Implicit in any consideration of the evidentiary use which
may be made of a criminal judgment entered on a plea of guilty
or a plea of nolo contendere in subsequent litigation is the question of the status of these judgments pursuant to the permanent
exclusionary proviso of Section 5(a).
Stated in terms of the defendant's case, a realistic appraisal
of the possible impact of Section 5 (a) in subsequent treble damage actions must be made in order for the defendant to properly
evaluate the relative effects under that section of the possible
alternative pleas of not guilty, with its accompanying trial,
guilty, or nolo contendere. The direct threat of subsequent treble damage actions may bear heavily on his choice of plea in the
20
criminal case.
The exclusionary proviso, by its express language, exempts
"consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has
been taken" from the scope of the "prima facie evidence rule" of
the section. 21 It is well settled that even under the most narrow
construction the proviso covers, at the very least, consent decrees in public civil actions.2 2 The question left undetermined is
whether criminal judgments entered on pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere are also within the scope of this exclusionary proviso
and therefore inadmissible in a subsequent treble damage action.
The underlying policy of the exclusionary proviso of Section
5 (a), as revealed by its legislative history and its subsequent
judicial implementation, tends to support application of the proviso to criminal judgments entered on pleas of guilty and pleas
of nolo as well as civil consent decrees. Nor is such application
inconsistent with the express language of the proviso. However,
three circuit courts of appeals have recently held that judgments
entered on pleas of guilty are not consent decrees within the
scope of the exclusionary proviso and therefore are admissible
in subsequent treble damage actions. 23 Two of these courts dis2

0 See generally Seeley, Pitfalls which Lurk in Government Litigation
for Defendants Who May Be Subjected to Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 17 (1959).
21 See text at note 14, supra.
22 See, e.g., City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825, 831

(9th Cir. 1964).

, 23 General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F. 2d 480 (5th Cir.
1964); City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825 (9th Cir.
1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers, 323 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
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tinguished these judgments from judgments entered on nolo
pleas, holding that the latter were consent judgments within the
scope of the exclusionary proviso.2 4 The United States Supreme
Court has yet to rule on these issues directly.
Legislative Intent
Prior to the passage, of Section 5(a), the general rule at
common law was that judgments in criminal actions could not
be received in subsequent civil actions as proof of the facts on
which they were based.2 5 Section 5(a) was the congressional
response to a presidential plea that "it was unfair that the private litigant should be obliged . .. to, establish again the facts
'2
which the government has proved.1
In the version originally passed by the House, Section 5 applied only to civil judgments and decrees, without distinguishing
between those obtained by consent or litigation. 27 The effect of
these judgments and decrees in subsequent litigation was made
conclusive.2 8 The Senate sought to modify the House version
24 See cases cited note 23 supra In General Electric Co. y. City of San
Antonio, 334 F. 2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964), the inadmissibility of judgnents entered on nolo contendere pleas was not challenged on appeal.
25 Buckeye Powder Co. v. Du: Pont Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918)
(Government judgment issued prior to passage of Section 5 (a) held inadmissible in subsequent suit).
The majority of jurisdictions still hold that a prior criminal judgment is
not admissible to prove the facts on, which it was based. Contra, Smith v.
Andrews, 54 Ill. App. 2d 51 203 N.E. 2d 160 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.

1029 (1966).

THE MODEL

ODE

OF

EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942), supports ad-

missibility of judgments entered on pleas :of nolo contendere or guilty but
the drafters' comment recognizes that this rule goes further than the reported decisions. The trend evolving is for the courts to abandon any general rule against admissibility and to evaluate each case on its own facts.
See cases on both points of view collected in' Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287
(1951).
26 51

CONG. REC. 1964 (i914).

This statement. was part of President

Wilson's address to a joint session of Congress. In relevant part it reads:
I hope that we shall. agree in giving private individuals.,, the right to
found their suits for redress upon the facts and judgments proved and
entered in suits by the Government ... and that 'the statute of limitations shall be suffered to run against such litigants only from the date
of the conclusion of the Government's action. It is not fair that the
private litigant should be obliged to set up and establish again the facts
which the Government has proved. He can not afford, he has not the
power, to make use of such processes of inquiry as the Government.has
command of.
27 H. R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2'(1914).
28 Id. But see id., Minority.Rep., at 9-10 (Remarks of Rep. Graham):
No hindrance should be put in the way of 'the Department of 'Justice in
respect to these [consent decree] negotiations. If this proposal were
enacted, it would deter any company from ever consenting to the entry
of a decree in a Government suit under the 'antitrust laws for such a
decree would simply invite a flood of litigation that might bankrupt
any company.
Though this argument is directed at the evidentiary. weight to be given
the prior judgment, the same rationale applies in considering whether
"consent decrees" should be excluded entirely from the .scope of the prima
facie section of 5(a).
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only to the extent of making the prior -judgment prima facie
rather than conclusive evidence in subsequent litigation.29 The
Joint Committee of both Houses, meeting to reconcile the variance between the House and Senate versions, recommended two
revisions not suggested by either pre-existing, version. First, the
scope of the section was -broadened to provide that final judg-

ments in criminal as well. as civil proceedings should be admissible as evidence in subsequent private suits.30 Second, and most
importantly, the joint conferees added the permanent exclusionary and temporary provisos which excluded consent judgments

and decrees, from 'the scope 'of the main section.3 1 This reised
bill as recommended by the Joint Committee Was subsequently
enacted'into law.
The congressional purpose in extending the scope of Section
32
5 to include criminal as well as civil judgments is self-evident.
Congress intended 'to give private suitors the same evidentiary

benefits from both criminal convictions aid' public civil suits.
However, the intended scope arid application of the permanent
exclusionary proviso is far less apparent. In essence, the ques-

tion raised by the language of the proviso was whether Congress
intended the term "consent judgments and decrees" to include
criminal judgments. entered on pleas of guilty and nolo contendere.
There is no written record of the Joint Committee's deliberations in adding the two provisos to the House and Senate

versions of Section 5:

The: only legislative source available to

reflect the congressional purpose in adopting the provisos is

the record of the floor' debates 'occurring after the joint comSee also, 51 CONG.
29 S. REP. No. 698, 63rd' Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1914).
REc. 13849 (1914).. After Section 5 was reported from the Joint'Conference

committee, the following statement by.Rep. Webb was made concerning'the
change made by the Senate:
Personally, ! think the Senate did the best thing by making it prima
facie ...

.,.

A great many lawyers,

.

... think that a provision making

the. judgment conclusive, would have rendered the bill unconstitutional,
but with the prima facie provision it is constitutional and will be as
effective [before ajury] as if we had left it conclusive.
51 CONG. REC. 16276 (1914).
30H. R. REP. No. 1168, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1914); S. Doc. No.
w
t
585, id. at 4..
31 For clarity, this "main" section will be hereinafter referred to as the
prima facie section of 5 (a), i.e., Section 5 (a) without its provisos.,
32 As 'originally' enacted,' Section 5 read : "That a final judgment or decree hereinafter rendered in-any criminal prosecution or in any suit or pro-.
ceeding in equity

.

. .

."

15 U.S.C. §16(a) (1964).

Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended,
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mittee report was submitted to both Houses for adoption 83 Some
courts, in construing the impact of the provisos on the primafacie
evidence rule, were forced to rely heavily upon this one limited
source.84
Conceptually, Section 5(a) was designed by Congress to
implement two distinct governmental policies, each of which
seems to facilitate the enforcement of the antitrust laws. The
prima facie section of 5 (a) was designed to give parties injured
by violation of the antitrust laws the benefit of prior judgments
The purpose of the exclusionary
obtained by the government.3
proviso was to preclude the prima facie section from hampering
efficient government enforcement of the antitrust laws. By
excluding "consent judgments and decrees entered before any
testimony was taken" from the effect of the prima facie section '8of6
5 (a), Congress sought to encourage capitulation of the "trusts,"
in order to reduce the government's burden and expense of prolonged litigation, while still achieving the ultimate goal of enforcement. It would seem that this purpose of the exclusionary
proviso would require the exemption of criminal judgments en83 For the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the permanent exclusionary proviso see:
Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary,63rd Cong., 2nd
Sess., ser. 7 at 242-48, 974-75, 1279-82 (1914) ; H. R. REP. No. 627, 63rd
Cong. 2nd Sess. 2.14 (1914); Minority Rep., H. R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 2
63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10 (1914) ; H. R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 3, 63rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. 5 (1914) ; House Debates (Original Bill) : 51 CONG.REC. 907989, 9910-11 (1914); S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 10, 45
(1914); Senate Debates (Original Bill): 51 CONG. REc. 13858-59, 13898,
13907 (1914) ; Conference Committee Report, S. Doc. No. 585, 63rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1914); Senate Debates: 51 CONG. REC. 15821-27,
15938-40, 16003-04, 16046-47, 16058-59, 16149, 16170 (1914) ; House Debates: 51 CONG. REC. 16276, 16319, 16342-44 (1914).
8
4See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F.
Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd in part, 323 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied 376 U.S 939 (1964); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp.
366 (J. Minn. 1939), aff'd, 119 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 644 (1941); Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F.
Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940). But cf. Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F. 2d
572, 578 (10th Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion) : "When we seek support for
our views in the legislative history of an act it is not too difficult to find
what we seek."
85 Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568
(1951); see 51 CONG. REC. 9270, 9488-90, 9494, 13851, 13853-56, 15939-40,
16319 (1914). As stated in Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp.
366 (D. Minn. 1939):
A defendant who stood trial and was found guilty, and against
whom a final judgment was entered, became therefore subject to the use
of said judgment as prima facie evidence in third party suits. Long and
burdensome litigation was thereby saved to the injured third party, and
the prima facie evidence of a final judgment would inure to his benefit.
Id. at 369; see also address of President Wilson, 51 CONG. REC. 1964 (1914),
at note 26, supra.
0 Twin Ports at 371: "Congress apparently intended to encourage consent judgments and decrees. It sought to induce prompt surrender to the
Government's demands by excluding consent judgments and decrees from
the prima facie rule." See also 51 CONG. REc. 15824 (1914) (remarks of
Sen. Lewis).
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tered on pleas of guilty83 or nolo contendere as well as consent
judgments in civil injunctive proceedings. As long as the defendant did not "put the government to its proof," he should not
be burdened in subsequent litigation by the prima facie rule of
Section 5 (a) 88
Although the intended legislative purpose of the exclusionary proviso is relatively clear, there remains the problem of
reconciling the express language of that provision with such
37 Indeed, the argument verbalized in favor of the exclusionary proviso
was "that it will induce the parties to come in and plead guilty." 51 CONG.
REC. 15939 (1914). But cf. the views of Sen. Walsh a member of the Conference Committee that drafted the proviso, in a colloquy, early in the debates, with Sen. Reed, who commented that a judgment entered on a guilty
plea should not be deemed a "consent" judgment so as to come within the
exclusionary proviso:
Mr. Walsh: He [Senator Reed] thinks the term 'consent judgment'
would reach to a judgment entered on a plea of guilty? Mr. Reed:

I think it would . . . It is really a judgment by consent .

. .

. The

only way you can consent in a criminal case is by an absolute plea of
guilty . . .

Mr. Walsh: . . . [N]o criminal would ever consent that

a judgment be entered against him when he pleads guilty.
ment goes as a matter of course against him

. .

The judg-

. I am not able to agree

with the Senator that in the future the judgment entered upon a plea
of guilty in a criminal action would not be available under the proposed
statute.
51 CONG. REc. 15823-24 (1914). Yet as the debates progressed, remarks of
other Senators taking part indicate that although there was disagreement as
to whether the proviso should be accepted, there was general agreement as
to its meaning and its purpose. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 16046 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Norris) : "The real effect of the proviso is to make the section
inapplicable to cases in which consent judgments have been taken in cases
where pleas of guilty have been entered by the defendant." Even those
opposed to acceptance of the exclusionary proviso in any form seemed to understand that it would operate to place judgments entered on guilty pleas
outside the ambit of the prima facie section, and thus were fortified in their
opposition to its passage. E.g., 51 CONG. REC. 15938-39 (1914) (remarks
of Senator Nelson) :
These provisos deal tenderly with the great trusts and monopolies,
who, knowing that they are guilty, can come into court, plead guilty,
and say, 'We have violated the law; we admit our guilt; we will agree
to a consent decree; but these decrees must not be used in other suits
against us where a private individual has been injured by the trust'
... I have no doubt, if this becomes a law, they will feel like pleading
guilty. (emphasis added)
Id. at 16059 (remarks of Senator Clapp):
. [Y]ou take away that prima facie effect when the criminal comes
into court and solemnly admits his guilt.... The vice in that proposition
is that. . we erect a 'city of refuge' for the criminal who comes to the
court and confesses his guilt .

. .

. (emphasis added)

See also, colloquy, id. at 16047, between Senators Borah and Norris:

Mr. Borah: . . . Not only that, but it [prima facie section] does not

apply to all judgments hereafter rendered, but only to those rendered
in contested cases. Mr. Norris: That is absolutely true.
88E.g., 51 CONG. REC. 16276 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb):
If the Government brings a suit against a trust or monopoly and it
surrenders, we eliminate the effect of the 'prima facie' judgment. If it
fights and loses, then the 'prima facie' effect is given final judgment in
the suit.
In Twin Ports at 376, Judge Nordbye summarized this view of the proviso: "That... Congress... intended by the provisos to 'encourage consent
udgments' in criminal cases, as well as equity proceedings, can scarcely
e gainsaid in view of the congressional record."
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purpose. The legislative history of the act cannot override its
express language, if clear and unambiguous. 9 The question is
then whether the phrase "consent judgments and decrees," used
in the proviso to define its scope, precludes any attempt by the
courts to read into it, by judicial construction, a more comprehensive exclusion covering judgments entered on pleas of guilty
and nolo, consistent with the manifest legislative intent of the
proviso.
Words of a statute are generally construed to have their
normal and customary meaning. The phrase "consent judgments and decrees" utilized in the exclusionary proviso was
normally applied only to final adjudications in civil actions. In
United States v. Hartford Empire Co.,40 the court defined a consent decree as "an agreement between the contending parties in
the case, such agreement meeting with the approval of the
The term "consent decrees," in this respect, concourt."'I1

notatively emphasizes the, consensus reached by the private
parties as to the disposition of the controversy, requiring only
formal approval by the court. Viewed' in this light, the term
cannot be applied to criminal matters where no such latitude is

extended 2to the parties to stipulate the criminal sanction to be
imposed.'

This narrow construction was effectively rebutted in Twin
Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co.,43 wherein the court pointed out

that there was nothing extraordinary about Congress using
"consent judgments" to signify capitulation in a criminal action:
.. (C)onsent does not necessarily refer to or indicate a bilateral
agreement; it may be unilateral. In Funk and Wagnall's New
Standard Dictionary, 'consent' is defined as a voluntary yielding
of the will, judgment or inclination to what is proposed or desired by another."4
To conclude, therefore, that Congress used the term "consent"
to mean the consent to judgment given by the defendant through
his plea of guilty or nolo is not inconsistent with the statutory
language used to express such intent.
That Congress intended this more inclusive interpretation
39 See, e.g Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 306
F. 2d 48, 51 (th Cir. 1962).
40 1 F.R.D. 424 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
41 Id. at 427. See also The Ansaldo San Giorgio I, 73 F. 2d 40, 41 (2nd
Cir. 1934), aff'd sub nom., The Ansaldo. San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros.
Co. 294 U.S. 494 (1935) : "A consent decree is an agreement of the parties
under the sanction of the court as to what the decision shall be."
42 See, e.g., Lenvin & Meyers, Nola Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L. J. 1255, 1267 (1942).
S43 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd, 119 F. 2d 747 (8th Cir.
1941), cert. dented, 314 U.S; 644 (1941).
44 Id. at 371. See, however, text at note 54, infra, for another suggested
construction of the term "consent judgments."
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is reinforced by the unequivocal language of the temporary proviso of Section 5, in which Congress expressly applied the term
"consent judgments or decrees" to both criminal and civil proceedings. As stated earlier,' 5 this temporary proviso provides
that Section 5 "shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees
rendered in criminal proceedings or suits in equity now pending
The inference to be drawn is that since Congress expressly included criminal cases in the temporary proviso in order to protect the consenting defendant in an action already begun at the time of enactment of Section 5, it therefore intended
that "consent judgments" in the exclusionary proviso would
cover future criminal cases as well."4
The Common Law ...

Even if the force of the legislative history and the judicial
construction of Section 5(a) suffices to extend the scope of the
exclusionary proviso to include criminal judgments, it is nonetheless arguable that the extension should be limited to judgments entered on nolo pleas, and not judgments entered on
guilty pleas.
The logic of this viewpoint finds some support in the fact
that, at common law, the admissibility of pleas of guilty and
pleas of nolo in subsequent actions was consistently distinguished. A plea of nolo contendere, at common law, was consistently treated as an "implied confession," an artificial presumption of guilt entertained solely for the sake of expedience
in the pending action, and thus not admissible in subsequent litigation as an admission by a party opponent.4 8 Conversely, a plea
45 See text at note 15, supra.
48 Id.
An exchange between Senators Nelson and Norris also seems to
demonstrate that the Conference Committee in drafting the provisos un-

derstood that the term "consent decree or judgment" encompassed criminal
judgments:
Mr. Norris: Does it [temporary proviso] mean that in the cases that
are now pending the trusts may come in and plead guilty before they
take all their testimony - that after this law is passed it will apply to

them?

Mr. Nelson: Yes certainly; and that you cannot use the judg-

ment itself in a suit brought by anyone else.
Compare Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp.
712, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1962) with Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil
Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 312 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (dictum as to plea of guilty).
47 It may, contrarily, be argued that reading Section 5 as a whole,

Congress used unmistakable language in both the prima facie section and
the temporary proviso to refer to criminal judgments.

Consequently, if

Congress intended to include criminal judgments within the meaning of
"consent judgments" in the exclusionary proviso, it would have done so explicitly.
(dic48 See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926)
turn); Mickler v. Fahs, 243 F. 2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1957); Simco Sales
Service of Penn., Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505, 506 (E.D,
Pa. 1963).
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of guilty was always deemed admissible at common law in subsequent litigation. 9
Some courts have adopted the common law distinction between the two pleas as one basis for holding that only judgments
entered on guilty pleas remain admissible under the prima facie
section of 5 (a) .50 However, being purely statutory, there is nothing to compel the assertion that Congress intended Section 5 (a)
to parallel the common law distinction between the two pleas.
Moreover, the plea of guilty remains admissible under the common law rules of evidence whether or not a judgment on such
plea is deemed inadmissible under the prima facie rule of Section 5(a).1 Consequently, the policy appeal for including such
pleas within the prima facie rule of 5(a), in order to aid the
private litigant, is diminished since the private suitor may, in
any event, invoke the common law rules of evidence to admit the
prior plea.
However, the suggestion that Section 5(a) differentiates
between judgments entered on pleas of guilty and pleas of nolo
finds further support in the express language of the section
when read together with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Rule 11, a defendant may only plead nolo
contendere, "with the consent of the court, ' 52 whereas a plea of
guilty may be entered by the defendant so long as it is made
49 E.g., Book v. Datema, 256 Ia. 1330, 131 N.W. 2d 470 (1966) ; Smith v.
Andrews, 54 111. App. 2d 51, 203 N.E. 2d 160 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1029 (1965); see WIGMORE, 4 EVIDENCE, §1066 (3rd ed. 1940); MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE, §242 (3rd ed. 1954).
5
o E.g, Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co. 207 F. Supp.
620, 626-27 (S.D. N.Y. 1962), aff'd on other grounds 312 F. 2d 236 (2nd Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963). This distinction was employed by
the court in City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825 (9th Cir.
1964):
We think it curious that antitrust lawyers who will and have spent
hours in urging district court judges that their clients should be permitted to plead nolo contendere rather than guilty to antitrust government charges, because of the differing effect of the two pleas, should
now urge there really is not and should not be any different consequences of the two pleas.
Id. at 835; see also note 89, infra.
51 Whether or not the guilty plea is admissible under §5 as prima
facie evidence, it may, depending on the terms of the consent decree
and the violations thereof alleged in the citation for contempt, be admissible under common law rules of evidence as an admission against
interest.
Sinco Sales Service of Penn. v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505, 507-08
(E.D. Pa. 1963); Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 207 F.
Supp. 620, 627 (S.D. N.Y. 1962). But see 51 CONG. REC. 15939 (1914),
wherein, during the debates on Section 5 one Senator observed that the
proviso would displace the common law rules as to admissibility of guilty
pleas: "You have got no more right to destroy the evidentiary value of
a plea of guilty in a trust case than in the case of an embezzler or murderer.
The evidence in either case can be used without any statute . ...
52 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 provides in part: "A defendant may plead not
guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere ....
"
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"voluntarily, ' 53 with an understanding of the nature of the charge
against him. Thus, a judgment entered on a nolo plea is a "consent judgment," in the sense that the consent of the court is a
procedural prerequisite, while a judgment entered on a plea of
54
guilty is not.
Balancing the Underlying Policies

While the Supreme Court has yet to determine the status
of judgments entered on pleas of guilty and nolo under Section
5(a), these matters have been carefully considered in several
lower court decisions, both at the trial and appellate levels. These
decisions have been unanimous in holding judgments entered on
pleas of nolo to be "consent judgments" plainly within the scope

of the exclusionary proviso. 55 With respect to judgments entered
on pleas of guilty, however, there has been some division among
53 See note 52, supra.
54 City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825, 835 (9th Cir.

1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F. 2d 412,

415-16 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
55 The status of nolo contendere pleas was first considered in Twin Ports
which firmly established that the judgment which follows acceptance of a

nolo plea is in essence a criminal "consent judgment" unavailable under
Section 5 as prima facie evidence in subsequent litigation. In that case, it
was argued that a " 'consent judgment' in a criminal case is an anomaly in
legal parlance." Id. at 371. The court replied:
If Congress intended to designate judgments entered on pleas of guilty
or nolo contendere, before any testimony had been taken, as consent
judgments this court must give effect to such intention, however unusual
or inappropriate the expression may be.
Id. It is significant that the issue before the court in Twin Ports concerned a judgment entered on a plea of nolo. Therefore, though well reasoned,
the opinion in Twin Ports is merely dicta as to the status of guilty pleas
under the exclusionary proviso. General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio,
334 F. 2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) (rejected Twin Ports as authority). See two
other early cases holding nolo pleas "consent judgments": Alden-Rochelle,
Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 3 F.R.D.
157, 159 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co.,
32 F. Supp. 308, 310-12 (E.D. Wis. 1940).
The Electrical Equipment cases in 1960 have reinforced the status of
nolo pleas as criminal "consent judgments", e.g., City of Burbank v. General
Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825, 830-35 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F. 2d 412, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) ; Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric
Co., 207 F. Supp. 620, 628-29 (S.D. N.Y. 1962) ; N.W. Electric Power Cooperative Inc. v. General Electric Co., 30 F.R.D. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1961);
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 308 F. 2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1961);
see also Illinois v. Sperry Rand Corp., 237 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ill. 1965)
(nolo contendere pleas coupled with express consent to entry of guilty findings). See generally Note, Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea, 75 YALE L. J. 845 (1966) ; cases collected in Plea of Nolo Contendere, 89 A.L.R. 2d 540, 604-05 (1963).
One of the issues left to be decided by the courts in regard to nolo pleas
is whether the judgment on the plea, or the plea itself, may be introduced
in subsequent private actions for some collateral purpose. See, e.g., Tseung
Chu v. Cornell, 247 F. 2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892
(1957) (in answer to inquiry on prior conviction, "fact of conviction" on
plea of nolo contendere admissible, although not as an admission of guilt.) ;
Pfotzer v. Aqua System, Inc., 162 F. 2d 779, 784-85 (2nd Cir. 1947) (conviction admitted as evidence to impeach a witness).
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the trial courts 6 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the three circuit
courts of appeals which have directly dealt with this question have
concurred in holding judgments entered on pleas of guilty admissible in subsequent private litigation within the scope of the
prima facie section of 5 (a) .7
In the most recent of the three appellate decisions, the Fifth
58
Circuit, in General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio concluded:
We agree with the conclusions reached by the 7th and 9th Circuits. The exclusionary proviso of Section 5(a) does not apply
to judgments entered on pleas of guilty by defendants in criminal
antitrust actions, and judgments entered on such pleas constitute
59
prima facie evidence of the violation of the antitrust laws.

The basic problem faced by the courts in these decisions lay
in choosing between the manifest policy of the prima facie section of 5 (a), that is, to aid persons injured by antitrust violations,6 0 and the manifest purpose of the exclusionary proviso,
which is to induce capitulation.6 1 Thus, the Court of Appeals

for 6the
Ninth Circuit in City of Burbank v. General Electric
Co., 2 observed that "the real nub of the controversy is to be
found in the delicate task of balancing the policies involved in
56 In Sacramento Municipal Utilities Dist. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.), 170552, at 77225 (N.D. Calif.
1962), the trial judge concluded that section 5(a), "by its terms, does not
apply to consent decrees, but a plea of guilty cannot be construed as being a
consent decree, any more than a crime can be consented to . . . and no
logical distinction appears herein between a plea of guilty and a conviction
after trial." (emphasis added) Compare Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 207 F. Supp. 620, 624-27 (S.D. N.Y. 1962), with Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1961 Trade
Cas.) 170,143 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Contra: N. W. Electric Power Cooperative,
Inc. v. General Electric Co., 30 F.R.D. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1961); see cases cited,
infra note 57.
5 General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F. 2d 480 (5th Cir.
1964); City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825 (9th Cir.
1964) ; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F. 2d 412
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). It is significant to note that
all three appellate decisions reversed district court rulings which held the
prior criminal judgments entered on pleas of guilty inadmissible under Section 5(a). See. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211
F. Supp. 712 (N.D. IlL 1962); Department of Water and Power of the City
of Los Angeles v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 32 F.R.D. 204 (S.D. Calif. 1963);
the lower court decision involved in General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio, supra was unreported. See also the opinions of court of appeals
Judge Knoch, dissenting 'in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 323 F. 2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1963) and the concurring opinion of
Judge Connally in General Electric Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F. 2d
480, 487-88 (1964), in which he concurred in the result solely because of the
weight of the decisions in the 7th and 9th circuits, supra. Judge Connally
indicated that if he had been faced with the issue as a matter of first impression he would have been "strained to dissent." Id. at 487.

58334 F. 2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964).
59 Id. at 487.
60 See text at notes 35-36, supra.
61 Id.
62329 F. 2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964).
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3

In reaching their conclusion that judgments entered on pleas of guilty were not consent judgments and
therefore admissible in subsequent private, litigation, the circuit
courts minimized the significance of the contra-indicating legislative history and narrowed the definition of the term "consent
judgments or decrees" within the context of the exclusionary
proviso.
antitrust enforcement.

This approach was premised on the fear that an extension
of the scope of the exclusionary proviso to include judgments
entered on both pleas of nolo and guilty would give almost exclusive recognition of the congressional policy of inducing capitulation in order to avoid the expense of trial and thus ignore
6
the policy of aiding parties who have been injured by violations. '
In the first reported case involving this question on the appellate
level, Judge Kiley in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 65 expressed this viewpoint:

If guilty pleas were held to be within the exclusionary proviso, the
private litigant, who is injured by the antitrust violation and who
is the subject of Congress's concern in enacting Section 5 (a), would
be, by the defendant's plea of guilty, thereby denied the total benefit of that section. Although that result may achieve one purpose
of the section in aiding enforcement of the antitrust laws, we think
it would help antitrust violators at the direct expense of the victims of those violations. Congress did not intend to confer a benefit in the body of Section 5 (a), indicating a primary purpose, and
through the proviso, 6allow
its frustration by the unilateral act of
6
an antitrust violator.
The distinction made by the circuits between pleas of nolo
and pleas of guilty attempts to strike a balance between the two
recognized policies of Section 5(a), in that the policy in favor
of aiding private litigants is served by holding judgments entered
on guilty pleas within the scope of the prima facie section and
the policy of inducing capitulation is served by holding judgments entered on nolo pleas within the scope of the exclusionary
proviso. As stated by the court in the Commonwealth Edison
case, "both purposes of Section 5 (a) and its proviso serve the
broad objective of antitrust enforcement, and although the two
63
.64

Id. at 834-35.
The dissent of Judge Knoch in Commonwealth Edison, and the special

concurring opinion of Judge Connally in City of San Antonio, considered the

policy of promoting capitulation to be paramount to the policy of assisting
private litigants, supra, note 57.
65 323 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
66 Id. at 415. See generally Matteoni, Antitrust Ambiguity Under Sec.
tion 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 11 U.C.L.A. L. R51. 792 (1964).
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an accommodation must be made to

7
preserve the essence of both. '11

To maintain a balance along the lines of this distinction
would seem to compel a restrictive position by the courts with
respect to accepting nolo contendere pleas. Otherwise, what is
saved by the policy of aiding private litigants through exclusion
of judgments entered on guilty pleas from the proviso is lost by
inclusion of judgments entered on nolo pleas, because a defendant has merely to plead nolo eontendere and avoid the effects
of the prima facie rule of Section 5(a) .61 Since under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a nolo plea can be
entered only with the consent of the court, the power to avoid

the evidentiary effects of Section 5(a) rests with the court and

not exclusively with the accused. Successive attorney generals
have strenuously urged the courts to adopt this restrictive position in regard to acceptance of nolo pleas. 9 On the other hand,
if nolo pleas will not be generally accepted in the future by the
courts and pleas of guilty are not to be construed as consent
judgments, then, practically speaking, all criminal judgments
are without the proviso and the policy of inducing capitulation
would be ignored. Therefore, to maintain this balance and not
completely frustrate the legislative purpose and intent of Con67323 F. 2d 412, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939
(1964). Also, in General Electric v. City of San Antonio, 334 F. 2d 480, 486
(5th Cir. 1964), the court observed that "it is obvious.., the general overall
objective of the Sherman and Clayton Acts will be served by construing Section 5 (a) in such a manner as to make compatible the differing purposes of
the Section and its proviso."
68 See note 55, supra. After the enactment of Section 5(a) and prior to
the Electrical Industry criminal cases in 1960, it was standard practice for
antitrust defendants to plead nolo contendere and thereby escape the effect
of the prima facie rule. The acceptance of such plea offers the further advantages of eliminating the time and expense of a full trial which would
follow a plea of not guilty, and of minimizing the adverse publicity and
stigma which would attach to a plea of guilty.
69 E.g., The attorney general set out the position of the United States
in a memorandum to United States Attorneys quoted in United States v.
Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n.1 (S.D. Calif. 1954):
Uncontrolled use of the pleas has led to shockingly low sentences and
insignificant fines which are no deterrent to crime. As a practical matter
it accomplishes little that is useful even where the Government has civil
litigation pending. Moreover, a person permitted to plead nolo contendere admits guilt for the purpose of imposing punishment for his
acts and yet, for all other purposes, and as far as the public is concerned
persists in his denial of wrongdoing . .. [T]he public regards consent
to such a plea by the Government as an admission that it has only a
technical case at most and that the whole proceeding was just a fiasco.
Also, in the Electrical Industry criminal cases, Attorney General Bicks
pleaded:
[Our position is that public interest in effective law enforcement, in
deterring the occurrence of like flagrancies in the future by these defendants and others ... suggests refusal on the part of this court to accept
nolo pleas.
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1960
Trade Cas.) 169699 at 76754 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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gress, the Justice Department and the courts should be careful
not to reduce the exclusionary proviso, apparently restricted to
civil consent decrees and judgments entered on pleas of nolo, to
a mere shadow by adoption of a rigid position against the entertainment of nolo contendere pleas. 70 There may be another means
available to balance the underlying policies of Section 5 (a), that
is, by regulating the evidentiary use to which the judgment will be
put in subsequent private litigation. This possibility will be
discussed in the ensuing sections of this Comment.
In summary, though Congress probably intended to exempt
criminal judgments entered on both pleas of guilty and nolo contendere from the effects of the prima facie rule of Section 5 (a) ,71
the courts by judicial construction have thus far restricted the
antitrust defendant from this avenue of escape. 72 Thus, the
courts have tipped the scales between the two conflicting policies
underlying Section 5(a) in favor of aiding the private litigant.
While, as noted above, the Supreme Court has yet to pass final
judgment on these issues, it has endorsed the policy of the

prima facie section of 5(a) and probably will agree, as the circuit courts have implied in their recent holdings, "that in the
long run justice for an injured individual in an antitrust situation should not be sacrificed in the interest of short term national
expediency.

73

70 The courts have thus far not been fully receptive to the Justice Department's position. E.g., in United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.
Calif. 1954), the court, in responding unsympathetically to the attorney

general's assertion regarding acceptance of nolo pleas, stated, " . . . It is not
binding upon the Court . . . [AInd in the absence of some reason why a

defendant should not have the benefit of the plea, the Court will ordinarily
allow it to be entered." Id. at 290.
However, there is some indication of an increasing acquiescence by the
courts to the government's antagonism toward the acceptance of nolo pleas
in antitrust prosecutions. For a discussion of current attitudes of the courts
and government in this regard, see Comment, Section 5 of the Clayton Act
and the Nolo Contendere Plea, 75 YALE L. J.845 (1966).
71 Accord, Seamons, Winson & McCartney, Use of Criminal Pleas in Aid
of Priate Antitrust Actions 3 DuQ. 167 (1964-65) ; Note, The Admissibility
& Scope of Guilty Pleas in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 71 YALE L. J.
684 (1961).
72 It is interesting to note that Congressman Emanuel Celler, in 1963,
introduced a bill to exempt guilty pleas from the operation of the exclusionary proviso, thus codifying the decisions of the courts that have so held,
supra, note 57. H.R. 8253, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reproduced at 109
CONG. REc. 16050 (1963). See discussion of this amendment to section 5 (a)
in Comment, 39 N. Y. U. L. REv. 518 (1964). This amendment would also
exclude from the proviso judgments entered on pleas of nolo contendere
which had been accepted over the objection of the Justice Department, and
thus would divest the courts of their control. See generally Comment, Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nola Contendere Plea, 75 YALE L. J. 845
(1966).
7. Guilford, Private Enforcement of United States Antitrust Policy, 10
ANTITRUST BULL. 747, 777 (1965).
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ELEMENTS OF PROOF IN A PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTION

To better understand the application of the evidentiary benefits of Section 5 (a) in subsequent private litigation, it is necessary to recognize the extent to which the elements of the public
and private antitrust actions are coextensive and consequently,
the extent to which proof of these elements in the public action
may be taken as prima facie established in the subsequent private
action.
It is well settled that to sustain a conviction under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, proof of the conspiracy alone is sufficient.
Conspiracies under the Sherman Act are not dependent on'any
overt act other than the act of'conspiracy itself as a condition to
liability.74 It is the "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce which the Sherman Act strikes
down, whether the concerted 'activity was successful or not."7 5
In a private treble damage action (under Section 4 of the Clayton Act), the 'private suitor must prove not only a general conspiracy in restraint of trade, but also an injury to his business
76
or property caused by the violation and actual damages.
As early as 1913, the United States Supreme Court in Nalle
V. Oyster7'7 enunciated the well established rule that "no civil action lies for a conspiracy unless there be some overt act that
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1918).
E.g., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.; 310 U.S. 150, 224 n. 59
(1940). See generally on Sherman Act conspiracies, Rahl, Conspiracy and
the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950). In prosecuting a Sherman
Act, §1 violation, if there is no evidence that the conspiracy was formed
within a certain district, the government may have to prove overt acts for
the limited purpose of establishing jurisdiction of the particular district
court to hear the case. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., supra.
76 See authorities cited note 11, supra. In a recent treble damage decision based on a conspiracy to fix the prices of electrical transformers,
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 171123, at 79438 (E.D. Pa. 1964), the trial judge
summarized the essential elements which must be proved to sustain recovery
of damages:
(1) . . . [Tlhat they did conspire, that they did agree and corhbine'to
fix, maintain or stabilize the prices of the electrical equipment here involved....
(2) . . . [Tihat they took action which affected' the prices paid by the
Plaintiffs; that is, that the Plaintiffs sustained injury totheir business
or property by reason of a higher price paid for transformers brought
about by a conspiracy and by the actions taken under the conspiracy..
(3) ... [Diamages which are capable of computation 'on a rational basis
74
75

from evidence which is presented

...

This case is discussed at greater length with respect to other issues raised.
Infra, text at notes 134-36.
77

230 U.S. 165 (1913).
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results in damage to the plaintiff. 7 8 . This general rule of liability has uniformly been applied in private antitrust actions. 9
As stated by the Ninth CircuitCourt of Appeals: -,
Civil private antitrust actions are founded, not upon. the mere
existence of a conspiracy, .but upon injuries which result
from the
commission of forbidden 'overt acts' by the conspirators. 80

Thus, it is evident that it is not. enough for a private suitor to
allege and prove a general violation of the antitrust laws. He
must, in addition, prove overt acts of one or more of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and, that he sustained some
consequential damage to his business or property of which the
overt acts were the proximate cause. 81 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has uniformly applied this rule of law. In Baldwin v.
Loews, Inc.,8 2 the court stated that a cause of action arises in a

private treble damage action only when "the blow" which caused
damage "was struck." 83 It is this impact of the violation directly

on the plaintiff, the so-called "fact of damage;" which constitutes
4
the gist of the action, not the violation itself
It follows that if the private suitor can rely on the prima
facie rule of Section 5 (a) to satisfy his burden of proof concerning the existence of the general conspiracy and the fact of damage, to the extent that the latter is of issue in the public action,
he can greatly enhance his chances of recovery. This is particularly true because the burden of prof concerning the amount
of damages, i.e., the third element of the plaintiff's cause of action,
is far less stringent than that required to prove the "fact of dam78 Id. at 182-83. Similarly, the court in Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229 F. 2d 248
(2nd Cir. 1956) emphasized:
The damage for which, recovery may be had in a civil action is not the
conspiracy itself but the injury to the. plaintiff produced by. specific overt

acts.

..

The charge of a conspiracy is merely the 'string' Whereby the

Plaintiff seeks to tie together those, who acting in concert, may be held
responsible in damages for any overt act or acts.
Id. at 252.
79See, e.g., Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 153 F.
Supp. 589, 592 (D.N.J. 1957), aff'd, 307 F. 2d 210 .(3rd Cir. 1962), ce'rt. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963) : '"The gravamen of the action lies not in the conspiracy but in the overt acts."
.
.
I
80 Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated, Inc. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd.

185 F. 2d 196, 208 (9th Cir..1950), cert.: denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
81 Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto. Sales Inc., 361 F. 2d 874, 883 (1st
Cir. 196.6) ; Farbenfabriken Bayer, A. G. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 153 F. Supp.
589, 592: (D.N.J. 1957), al'd,,307 F. 2d 210 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 929 (1963) ; Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F. 2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943),
ce'rt. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944)..
.82 321 F. 2d 287 (7th Cir. 1963).
Said. at 290-291. See also 'Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
229 F. 2d 714 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Beegle v. Thompson,. 138 F. 2d 875, 881 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 748 (1944).
84 Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922) ; Stearns
v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F. 2d 589, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1957),; Burnham Chemical
Co.'v. Borax Consol., 107 F. 2d 569, 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1948).

130

The John MarshallJournal of Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 1:111

age."8 5 The plaintiff must present evidence that he sustained
damages definitely attributable to the wrong. While such damages must be capable of reasonable computation and not based on
mere speculation and conjecture,86 "the wrongdoer is not entitled
to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and
precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is
-87
responsible for making, were otherwise ....
An examination of the elements of a treble damage action
brings to light the difficult problems of proof faced by the private
claimant and reemphasizes the importance of ascertaining the
extent to which he may utilize a judgment as prima facie evidence to establish the several elements of his case.
This problem becomes increasingly difficult with respect to
judgments entered on pleas of guilty once it has been established
that these judgments fall within the scope of the prima facie Section of 5 (a) and are not consent judgments or decrees within the
meaning of the exclusionary proviso. In other words, of what
value is this prior judgment to the private suitor in establishing
the three elements of his treble damage action?
EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A PRIOR JUDGMENT UNDER SECTION 5 (a)

The Emich Guidelines ...

The evidentiary value to the private suitor of a prior judgment under Section 5(a) was first considered by the Supreme
Court in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.8 8 This
opinion was a milestone in the judicial implementation of the
section. While this decision dealt with a prior judgment entered after trial on a plea of not guilty, the Supreme Court set
down general guidelines to determine the evidentiary use and
scope of prior judgments under Section 5 (a) in any given private
antitrust suit.89
85 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1946)
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-64
(1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359, 378-79 (1927); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjoro, 246 F. 2d 368, 392-94 (9th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1957). See generally, McConnell,
The Treble Damage Action, U. ILL. L. F. 659, 665-68 (1950).
86 See authorities cited note 85, supra.
8 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
562-63 (1931).
88 340 U.S. 558 (1951). In addition to its Emich decision, the Supreme
Court applied the "estoppel" standard of Section 5(a) in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
89 The Supreme Court's opinion in Emich made no explicit extension
of the prima facie section to judgments entered on guilty pleas. It may
therefore be questioned whether the "estoppel" under section 5 (a) should be
applied to judgments entered on guilty pleas or limited to judgments after
trial on the issues. The basic rationale of "estoppel" is to prevent relitiga-
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In Emich,90 the plaintiff sought to introduce the prior criminal judgment which the government obtained prior to the commencement of the private suit, including the indictment, and the

entire record of the criminal case, under Section 5 (a), as prima
facie evidence of the general conspiracy between the defendants
and also, the "fact of damage," i.e., that Emich's dealer franchises

were cancelled pursuant to the unlawful conspiracy.9'

The Su-

preme Court held that "the criminal judgment was 'prima facie'

evidence of the general conspiracy, for the purpose of monopolizing the financing of GM cars and also of its effectuation by coercing GM dealers to use GMAC.11 12 In reasoning from the private
suitors' contentions to its final holding on the evidentiary use of
such prior judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized and was
guided by the general congressional purpose in enacting Section

5 (a), i.e., to aid private suitors in bringing their damage actions.
In addition, the court looked to the express wording of the section
which made a prior judgment or decree available to a private
tion of issues already adjudicated. See authorities cited, note 97, infra.
With a judgment based on a guilty plea, there is no actual "litigation" of
any issues. The courts, however, have held that the guidelines set down in
Emich are applicable to these judgments; that judgments entered on guilty
pleas dp have "estoppel value" in subsequent suits between the same parties.
As stated in United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907,
909 (D.N.J. 1955): "Nor is it material whether the judgment of conviction
results from a trial or from a plea of guilty." Accord, United States v.
Bower, 95 F. Supp. 19, 21 (E.D. Tenn. 1951). This argument rests on
the grounds that a party convicted after a denial of guilt should suffer no
greater burden than one who pleads guilty and thus expressly admits his
guilt.
Since a plea of nolo contendere is but an "implied confession," i.e., it
establishes the fact of guilt solely for the purpose of the particular case in
which it is tendered and accepted it is distinguished from a guilty plea in
that the former works no estoppef. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 272
U.S. 451, 455 (1926). Therefore, an alternative ground for holding judgments based on nolo pleas outside the scope of the prima facie rule of Section 5 (a) is that "they do not create an estoppel between the parties" to the
overnment action. Barnsdall Refining Co. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F.
upp. 308, 312-13 (E.D. Wis. 1940). But see, Dalweld Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 252 F. Supp. 939, 942 n. 1 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
90 The Emich case arose when plaintiff, a Chevrolet dealer, sued for
treble damages pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act alleging that he
had been damaged by a conspiracy between defendants, General Motors
(GM) and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) (GM's subsidiary engaged in supplying credit facilities to dealers and retail purchasers of autos), in restraint of interstate commerce in automobiles manufactured by GM. More specifically, plaintiff alleged that cancellation of his
dealer franchise had resulted from his refusal to finance his sales through
GMAC. For detailed discussions of the Emich decision consult Notes, 62
YALE L. J. 417 (1952), 65 HARv. L. RaV. 1400 (1952), 46 ILL. L. REV. 765
(1951).
91 See text at note 84, supra. The specific issues before the Supreme
Court on appeal were (a) whether the indictment in the antecedent criminal
action was admissible in the civil case, and (b) whether the judgment
therein could be used as evidence that the conspiracy of which defendant
had been convicted occasioned Emich Motors' franchise cancellation. Emich
Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 566 (1951).
92 Emich case at 571.
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suitor as prima facie evidence "as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between... "
the defendant and the government. Thus, the Court observed:
Congressional reports and debates on the proposal which ultimately became §5 reflect a purpose to minimize the burdens of litigation for injured private suitors by making available to them
all matters previously established by the government in antitrust

actions

. . ..

The Court proceeded to establish the "general doctrine of
estoppel"'9 5 as the test by which to determine those issues of the
prior litigation admissible under Section 5 (a) in the subsequent
litigation. The Court predicated its reasoning upon the express
provision of the section which set forth "estoppel" as the guiding

standard, stating:
We think that Congress intended to confer subject only to a defendant's enjoyment of its day in court against a new party, as
large an advantage as the
estoppel doctrine would afford had the
9 6
government brought suit.

It must, at this point, be emphasized that Section 5 (a)
creates no "estoppel" as the term is generally defined, since under
the statute the judgment is given only prima facie effect rather

than the conclusive effect which would be accorded to it under an
application of traditional "collateral estoppel" theory.9 7 The principles of collateral estoppel were merely made the hypothetical

criteria for ascertaining the issues which are primafacie evidence
in the subsequent suit. As the Court stated:
93 Id. at 568.
94

Id.

95 Id. The term generally used to describe this doctrine is "collateral
estoppel."

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §68, comment a (1942); see Scott,

Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3 n. 4 (1942).
96 Emich case at 568.
97 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §68:

(1) Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually'litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination
is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different
cause of action . . . (emphasis added).

(2) A judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in a subsequent action on a different cause of action as to questions of fact not
actually litigated and determined in the first section.
This common law doctrine is called "collateral estoppel," supra, note 95, and,
as §68 indicates, applies only to matters "essential to the judgment ... actually litigated and determined." This doctrine is distinguished from the
broader doctrine of res judicata. Under the latter doctrine, not only essential matters actually litigated are conclusively determined but also those
matters which might have been but were not litigated between the parties
in'the prior action. These are conclusive in a subsequent proceeding based
on the same cause of action. E.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591
(1948) ; see also cases collected in Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F. 2d 502, 510
(5th Cir. 1958)', cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); see generally, Scott,
CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1942); Developments
in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818 (1952).
The classic statement of the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" appears
in United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 38 (1950):
The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right,
question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a
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Such estoppel extends only to questions 'distinctly- put in issue and
directly determined' in the criminal prosecution (.... In the case of
a criminal conviction based on a jury verdict of gu*ilty, issues which
were essential to the verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the judgment .... ) Accordingly, we think plaintiffs

are entitled to introduce the prior judgment to establish prima faicie
all matters of fact and law necessarily decided by the conviction
8
and the verdict on which it was based.

The Court, in Emich, then addressed itself to the question of
whether application of the "collateral estoppel" test would prima
facie establish only the general conspiracy or whether it would

extend the judgment to establish the "fact of damage" element as
well. As noted previously, the jury in the antecedent criminal
action returned a general verdict of guilty pursuant to an indictment which had charged a general conspiracy for the purpose of
monopolizing the financing of' cars. Faced with a detailed'and
comprehensive indictment, alleging the various means used to

effectuate the conspiracy, the Supreme Court had the task of
adopting the "estoppel" test to ascertain "those matters actually
litigated and essential to the verdict." Under these circumstances, the Court stated:
court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies;
and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right,
question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties
or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the
judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.
As stated above, traditionally, the doctrine, applies only between the same
parties or their privies in the subsequent litigation. This condition of "identity of parties" was based on the assumption that "mutuality of estoppel"
had to exist before the doctrine could be applied. See, e.g., Schafer v.
Robillard, 370 Ill. 92, 17 N.E. 2d 963 (1938). That is, the estoppel operates
mutually if the one taking advantage of it would have been bound by it
had it gone the other way. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
Since however, the doctrine of estoppel
811, 122 P. 2d 892, 894 (1942).
"rests at bottom upon the ground that the party to be affected . . . has litigated or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action,
in a court of competent jurisdiction," Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464,- 467 (1918), the courts have held that "mutuality of
estoppel" is no longer necessary to apply the doctrine. See, e.g., B. R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, - N.Y. Ct. App. - (1967), 35* LAW WEEK 2522 (1967);
United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D. Wash.;
D. Nev. 1962), aff'd on this issue sub nom., United Air Lines Inc. v. Wiener,
335 F. 2d 379, 404 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, United Air Lines v. United
States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra at 812,
122 P. 2d at 894-95 (1942) (dictum).
It is interesting to consider how this change in the common law application of the collateral estoppel doctrine might affect the future implementation of section 5(a). Now that mutuality may no longer be a prerequisite
under the common law, a defendant may find greater protection if the judgment entered on his plea of guilty were to be covered under the prima facie
section 6f 5,(a) rather than under the exclusionary proviso. Under the prima

facie secion of 5 (a), no more than "prima facie" effect would be given to the
adjudicated issues while, if within the exclusionary proviso, plaintiff would
be free to apply the collateral estoppel doctrine under the common law and'
thus give "conclusive" effect, to the adjudicated issues. It is thus not hard
to imagine a treble damage plaintiff, under this new "rule of mutuality,"
reversing his position and arguing that judgments entered on guilty pleas
are "consent judgments" within the exclusionary proviso.
98 Emich case at 569.
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The difficult problem .... is to determine what matters were adjudicated in the antecedent suit. A general verdict of the jury or
judgment of the court without special findings does not indicate
which of the means charged in the indictment were found to have
been used in effectuating the conspiracy. . . . And since all of the
acts charged need not be proved for conviction, . . such a verdict
does not establish that the defendants used all of the means charged
or any particular one. Under these circumstances what was decided by the criminal judgment must be determined by the trial
judge hearing the treble-damage suit, upon an examination of the
record, including the pleadings, the evidence submitted, the instructions under which the jury arrived at its verdict, and any
opinions of the courts. 9

Once this determination is made, the trial judge must properly
present these adjudicated issues to the jury including, at his discretion, appropriate portions of the record reflecting these issues.100

The Supreme Court was thus unwilling to hold that the prior
government judgment was evidence of the "fact of damage" element as contended by the plaintiff. Nor, on the other hand, did
the Court adopt the more limited interpretation of the lower appellate court that "the judgment was prima facie evidence only
Bo d. The wording in this passage is somewhat ambiguous. The court
previously referred to issues actually adjudicated and essential to the
verdict, supra text at note 98, as prima facie determined by the prior judgment. Admittedly, this is in strict compliance with the general doctrine
of collateral estoppel, supra note 97. However, the Supreme Court in this
cited passage concerned itself with the determination of the specific acts in
the detailed indictment "adjudicated and found to be used," making no reference to "essentiality." In a criminal antitrust action the conspiracy or
agreement alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Sherman
Act and it is not necessary to prove any means or overt acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy, supra text at note 74. Thus, as was argued by the court
of appeals, 181 F. 2d 70, 76 (7th Cir. 1950), none of the means even though
adjudicated were "essential to the verdict." However as the Supreme Court
concluded, if one or some of the means are proved, they are "essential"
in the sense that these means were adopted by the jury as the basis for
finding the general conspiracy in its essential nature. That is, the "fact of
coercion" proven in the Emich criminal proceedings was a factor giving rise
to the inference of conspiracy, and thus within the doctrine of "estoppel."
100 Emich case at 571. As the Supreme Court observed:
He [the trial judge] is not precluded from resorting to such portions
of the record, including the pleadings and judgment, in the antecedent
case as he may find necessary and appropriate to use in presenting to
the jury a clear picture of the issues decided . . . . A similar discretion
must be exercised in approving the attachment of a copy of the indictment as an exhibit to the complaint.
Id. On the other hand, it may be argued that according to the express
wording of Section 5(a), it is the "final judgment of the prior criminal
proceeding" that is to be prima facie evidence against the defendant, and
thus, the only document that should be presented to the jury is the formal
judgment. Any other document, such as the indictment, admitted into evidence, would be overly prejudicial to the defendant, and beyond the evidentiary
benefits
to be that
available
to the 5(a)
private
suitor.
tion gives
wayintended
to reasoning
if Section
is to
truly The
be anconstruc"aid to
private suitors," the trial judge should, if necessary, go beyond the prior
formal judgment to define and present to the jury, those matters settled
by the government litigation.
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It adopted a middle position in hold-

ing that the jury verdict in the criminal action was admissible
in the civil action to establish the fact of coercive conduct which
was held to be essential in the criminal action to establish the
ultimate fact of conspiracy.'02 The Supreme Court thus allowed
plaintiff to use this finding of "overt acts of coercion" as a basis

for establishing the second element of his prima facie case, the
"fact of damage." The Court concluded:
To establish their prima facie case, it therefore was necessary for
petitioners only to introduce in addition to the criminal judgment,
evidence of the impact of the conspiracy on them [the fact of
damage], such as the cancellation of their franchises and the purpose of
GM in cancelling them and evidence of any resulting dam02
ages.

This result reflects the application of a liberal "estoppel"
standard to carry over into the subsequent action not merely the
bare ultimate finding of a general conspiracy, which finding was
by itself sufficient to sustain the conviction,' 0 but also the factual
determinations essential to support that finding.105 Thus, the

Court gave dimension to its assertion that Section 5(a) allows
101 General Motors Corp. v. Emich Motors Corp., 181 F. 2d 70 (7th Cir.
1950). The court of appeals had previously held, in part:
(1) The indictment was not admissible in evidence, (2) the prior
judgment was not admissible as evidence, the dealer's franchise was
cancelled pursuant to the conspiracy but only as evidence that defendant had been guilty of a conspiracy to restrain dealers' interstate trade
and commerce in GM cars for the purpose of monopolizing the financing
essential to the movement of their cars, and (3) approved the trial
court's ruling as to the inadmissibility in evidence of the entire record
of the criminal case (emphasis added).
Id. at 74-76.
102 Emich Motors v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 570 (1951).
The trial judge in the criminal proceeding had instructed the jury that in
order to find the ultimate fact of conspiracy in restraint of trade the jury
had to first find that the defendants had coerced their dealers into using the
facilities of GMAC. "That almost is the fact question of this case, whether

the dealer could act as a free man .

.

."

United States v. General Motors

Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
103 Emich case at 571 (emphasis added).
104 See text at notes 74-75, supra.
105 Cf., State of Michigan v. Morton Salt Co.,

259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn.
1966). In this consolidated treble damage action, the court dealt with a
prior government civil decree and accompanying findings of fact, (which
determined a price-fixing conspiracy had existed) and ruled "that the government decree was prima facie evidence of a conspiracy, its effectuation,
and impact upon all plaintiffs located in the six-state area named in the
government's complaint, rather than merely those identified in the government's evidence." Id. at 76. The court distinguished the Emich case:
The express determinations made here can be contrasted with the
general verdict involved in Emich ....

Even though the Emich plain-

tiffs gave testimony in the government action, the general verdict did
not necessarily determine that they had been coerced pursuant to the
conspiracy. Thus, they had to show impact.. .. The decree here is based
on findings that the conspiracy resulted in submission of almost identical bids to the named sixteen [agencies] and that they were thereby
deprived of the advantage of competitive bidding.
Id. at 72-73. The court went further, as noted above and held that although
the government's proof of the fact of damage was limited to sixteen agen-
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the private suitor "as large a prima facie advantage as the estoppel doctrine would afford had the government brought the subsequent suit."'10
Application of Emich Guidelines ...

It is questionable whether the collateral estoppel doctrine
applied in Emich was fully consistent with the traditional application of this doctrine' 0 7 or whether there was an implicit extension of the scope of this doctrine to accommodate the overriding
policy of Section 5 (a), to favor the private litigant.
.According to the Restatement rule, 08 "a question of fact
essential to the judgment ...

actually litigated and determined

is conclusive between the parties."' 0 9 Emich purports to
apply a traditional test of "essentiality" 110 to justify searching
beneath the ultimate fact of conspiracy to find the underlying mediate facts necessary to support this ultimate finding. This approach, apparently followed in Emich, would seem to be in conflict with the "ultimate facts" test"' of "essentiality." Under the
latter test, only the ultimate facts determined by the judgment
cies, the proof was "indicative of bids to public authorities generally," id. at
74, and thus the prima facie benefits extended to local agencies throughout the states covered. But cf., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distributing Corp., 846 U.S. 537, 543 (1954). In extending the scope of "estoppel" to the localities, the court rested its conclusion "on the realization
that the government's proof was limited to' sixteen agencies primarily to conserve trial time," id., and on the suggestion in the Emich case that "Congress
intended to give private plaintiffs as large an advantage as the estoppel
doctrine can afford." Id. It would seem, however, that the court in the
Morton case, stretched the concept of "essentiality" as construed in Emich
beyond recognition in its effort to aid the private suitor.
108 See text at note 96, supra.
'o'

See note 97, supra.

§68 (1). A full statement of this rule
appears in note 97, supra.
109 Id. (emphasis added) If all matters "actually litigated" were subject
to collateral estoppel, lawsuits would be very hazardous, since every subsidiary matter actually decided would be held conclusive in subsequent suits. In
addition, the rationale for requiring "essentiality" is artly historical. At
early common law, the record consisted only of the' pleadings, verdict, and
judgment without a transcript or any other trial proceeding. Thus, the court
in a subsequent action could, in any event, only apply estoppel to "ultimate
facts." See Developments in the Law - Res Judicata,65 HARv. L. REV. 814,
840 (1952). The same reasoning applicable to early common law cases
would seem to apply to judgments entered on guilty pleas.
110See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, §693 (5th ed. 1925). "All matters
which the record and pleadings indicate must have been decided in order to
reach final judgment will be given collateral effect." The courts which have
adopted this formulation refuse to distinguish between "ultimate" facts and
"mediate" facts decided in the first suit, so long as they were necessary to
the result. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F. 2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
l1i King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9 (1844) ; see also, Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz,
334 F. 2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Paulos v. Janetakos, 46 N.M. 390, 129 P. 2d
636 (1942); cases collected in Note, 142 A.L.R. 1243 .(1943).
108 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS,
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are admissible in a subsequent action.11 2 As analyzed by Judge
Learned Hand in The Evergreens V. Nunan,"8 an ultimate fact
is a hypothetical construct connoting "those facts upon whose
combined occurrence the law raises the duty or the right in question."1 According to Judge Hand, all other facts decided in the
case are mediate or evidentiary facts." 5 As such, under an ultimate facts approach to "essentiality," the collateral estoppel doctrine would not extend to these facts."16
Subjecting the facts in the Emich case to Judge Hand's definition would leave the finding of "coercive acts," as a mediate and
not an ultimate fact, since, as noted earlier, overt acts were not
necessary elements of a Sherman Act, Section 1 violation,"1 but
were only evidentiary facts, from which the ultimate fact of conspiracy was inferred. Therefore, applying the narrow traditional
"essentiality" test, as defined in Evergreens, this fact of coercion
should not have been accorded prima facie effect in the subsequent private suit.
It should be noted, however, that while Judge Hand clarified
the ultimate facts approach to determine the scope of collateral
estoppel, he did not himself espouse the adoption of this test or
the more liberal test later applied by the Supreme Court in Emich,
since the holding of The Evergreens case did not depend upon the
application of either test."8 In a later portion of his opinion,
Judge Hand did recognize that "essentiality" should not be contingent upon the ultimate or mediate nature of the fact but upon a
determination of whether the fact was necessary to the result in
112 For a discussion of the "ultimate facts rule" consult Note. Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 52 COL. L. REV. 747, 660-63 (1952); Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 814, 840 (1952).
118 141 F. 2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 720 (1944).
114Id.
at 928. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, §68, comment (p) originally
referred to "facts in issue" being given conclusive effect as opposed to "evidentiary facts;" see, e.g., Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F. 2d 262, 264 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965). In 1948, Judge Hand's formulation of ultimate facts was adopted to define "facts in issue." See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, 1948 Supp. at 336-37 (1949).
115 "Mediate data are those underlying or evidentiary facts from whose
existence may be rationally inferred the existence [of ultimate facts]." The
Evergreens case at 928.
(estoppel as
116 See, e.g., Norton v. Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 517 (1925)
to incidental, evidentiary facts rejected).
117 See text at notes 74-75, supra.
118 The issue decided in The Evergreens case was whether determinations in the first suit, be they ultimate or mediate, are conclusive as to facts
mediate to the second action. The court held that in the second action, regardless of whether the issues in the first action were mediate or ultimate,
such facts would not be conclusive except as to the ultimate issues in the
second suit. Thus it was not necessary for Judge Hand to choose between
the narrow and liberal essentiality test, since neither would apply in Evergreens with respect to determining the mediate facts in the second suit.
The Supreme Court accepted and applied this principle in Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 337-38 (1957).
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the suit, which in turn would determine whether "it will be really
disputed and the loser will have put out his best efforts."",,,
This disparity between the liberal "essentiality" test of estoppel applied in Emich and the traditional "ultimate facts" test
does not appear to have been recognized by the lower courts. In
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,1 2 0 where the question of admissibility of a prior judgment based on a jury verdict of guilty
in a subsequent private antitrust action was raised, the court applied the narrow "ultimate facts" test to determine the prima
facie effect of the judgment under Section 5 (a) .121 The court
adopted the narrow Evergreens definition without even acknowledging any conflict with the test of "essentiality" implicitly applied in Emich.
Perhaps some further clarification should emanate from the
Supreme Court to emphasize that for purposes of Section 5(a)
the more liberal test of "essentiality" implicitly applied in Emich
should control.
Judgments Entered on Pleas of Guilty...
Irrespective of the question as to which test should generally
be applied to determine "essentiality" in the application of the
"collateral estoppel" doctrine, it is clear that the Emich decision
delineates the scope of the "estoppel" in a Section 5 (a) case. However, the guidelines in Emich are not fully dispositive of the evidentiary use, under that section, of judgments entered on pleas
of guilty. Since the prior criminal judgment available in the
Emich case was entered after a jury trial on the issues, the en119 Evergreens case at 929-30:
It is, as we have said, a condition upon the conclusive establishing of
any fact that its decision should have been necessary to the result in
the first suit. That is a protection, for it means that the issue will be
really disputed and the loser will have put out his best efforts. It can
make no difference in this regard whether the original issue was as to
an "ultimate" fact or as to a "mediate" datum; the parties can have no
interest in what place in the logical hierarchy the issue occupies, if only
the final outcome hinges upon it.
Judge Hand continued, by way of dictum; and added another limitation:
Were the law to be recast, it would therefore be a pertinent inquiry
whether the conclusiveness of facts decided in the first, might not pro
erly be limited to future controversies which could be thought reasonably
in prospect when the first suit was tried.
Id. In Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F. 2d 502, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1958), the
court adopted its own version of the "ultimate facts" rule:
... [C]ollateral estoppel by judgment is applicable only when it is evident from the pleadings and record that determination of the fact in
question was necessary to the final judgment and it was foreseeable that
the fact would be of importance in possible future litigation.
Cf. Barzilay v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
120 221 F. Supp. 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), interlocutory appeal denied,
(2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
121 Id. at 491.

("

. .

. I conclude that only ultimate facts determined in

the first suit are prima facie evidence of the ultimate facts in the second
suit.")
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tire record of the criminal case was available to the trial judge in
determining the issues adjudicated and provided the judge with12a
sound basis for giving the term "estoppel" a broad construction.
However, when the prior judgment, in a Section 5 (a) situation, is entered on a plea of guilty, the trial judge has only the
indictment, the plea itself, and the formal judgment entered
thereon to examine in order to determine what issues were decided by the former government litigation. How, then, is he to
determine according to the principles of the Emich decision "all
matters of fact and law necessarily decided by the conviction."
Since, in almost all criminal antitrust actions, the indictment
charges that the defendant used more than one means to effectuate the conspiracy, 123 it would seem to follow that the judgment on the plea would not establish any particular means as
"essential." Conceptually, the trial judge would be limited to a
determination that only the general fact of a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws was decided, i.e., only the first element of
the private suitor's prima facie case.
With only a limited record available when the judgment has
been entered on a plea of guilty, the indictment, as the only comprehensive writing specifying the matters in issue, is instrumental in determining which of these issues should be given
prima facie effect in subsequent private litigation.2 4 On this
point, several recent decisions, in damage suits brought by the
government, have considered this problem in applying the common law collateral estoppel doctrine where Section 5 (a) was not
involved.

12

5

See text at note 99, supra.
See text at notes 98-99, supra.
124 Since the government draws the criminal indictment, this could place
the power to determine the subsequent evidentiary effects of the prior judgment, practically, in the hands of the government. As such, this fact could
have significance in terms of bringing together the conflicting policy considerations of Section 5(a) and its proviso; see text at note 67, supra. As exemplified by the exclusionary proviso of Section 5(a), Congress intended
that the government obtain relief in the most efficient manner possible by
encouraging capitulation. This policy could be effectuated by drawing the
criminal indictment in very general terms, specific enough to meet the minimal test of sufficiency under the Sherman Act, see Radiant Burners Inc. v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961); Note, 71 YALE
L. J. 684, 696-98 (1961), yet broad enough so that the trial judge in a subsequent private action can take only a narrow view as to the prima facie
scope of the "estoppel."
In return, the defendant may be willing to enter
a plea of guilty. Since judgments entered on guilty pleas are not "consent
judgments" within the proviso, see note 57, supra, subsequent treble damage plaintiffs are entitled to the evidentiary benefits of the section. Utilizing this approach the government, to some extent, still perpetuates the primary purpose of Section 5(a) to aid private suitors, yet accomplishes its
goal of enforcement without trial.
125 United States v. Guzzone, 273 F. 2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1959); United
States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.J. 1955); United
States v. American Packing Corp., 113 F. Supp. 223 (D.N.J. 1953). In each
of these civil suits the government sought to recover damages following a
122
123
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In each of these decisions, the court examined the "collateral
estoppel" effect of a prior criminal judgment entered on a plea of
guilty to an indictment charging conspiracy. The court in each,
narrowly limited the scope of the "estoppel" and held the defendants conclusively estopped from denying the "existence of
the particular conspiracy in its essential nature and their participation therein,1126 but not from denying the commission of particular overt acts alleged in the indictment. 127 As stated, for ex1 28
ample, in United States V. Ben Grunstein& Sons Co:
But since in a criminal conspiracy case proof of the unlawful
agreement between the parties, plus the commission of any overt
act, not necessarily all those alleged, suffices to support a verdict
of guilty, no conviction of a criminal conspiracy whether on verdict or plea, suffices of itself, without further evidence to prove
that defendant either admitted, or was found guilty by the jury, of
committing any particular overt act. Nor if the conspiracy- is alleged to have been effectuated, as in Emich Motors, by a number of
means, each of which would have sufficed therefore, can it be determined on a plea of guilty to such count, which of such means
were admitted by the defendant to have been adopted for that purpose .

. .

. All that such plea admits is 'the existence of the con-

spiracy as charged as well as participation therein by the defendants so pleading.' . . . But . . . the conspiracy as charged means

the admission of that particular conspiracy in its essential nature,
else the pleading defendants could not later
plead double jeopardy
1 29
to another indictment of that same nature.
However, the court observed, by way of dictum, that if the
indictment were so framed that it emphasized particular overt
acts as essential characteristics of the conspiracy, wherein a
judgment on the plea would be necessarily determinative of these
underlying facts as well, the "collateral estoppel" doctrine would
then preclude their denial at a subsequent trial. The court, in
the Grunstein case continued:
... [I]f then this bribery allegation is but the statement of one of
the many means used for effectuating the conspiracy, the plea to
the indictment does not constitute an admission of his bribery.
... If the bribery is read as alleging one of the essential charactercriminal conviction for a conspiracy to file false claims against it, attempting to introduce the prior conviction under the rules of collateral estoppel as
conclusive evidence of the general conspiracy and particular overt acts committed pursuant thereto.
126 E.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F. Supp. 907,
910 (D.N.J. 1955).
127 E.g., United States v. American Packing Corp., 113 F.
Supp. 223,
225 (D.N.J. 1953): "The specification of illegitimate activities appended to

the bald charge of conspiracy may be considered in the nature of a bill of
particulars, advising the accused of the acts upon which the government
bases its denunciation."
128 127 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.N.J. 1955).
129 Id. In this case, proof of overt acts was required by statute; otherwise, proof of the unlawful agreement between the parties is sufficient to
support a conviction, no overt acts being required. See text at note 74,
supra.
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istics 'of the indictment pleaded to, the plea would have admitted
it."o

Nevertheless, any ambiguity as to whether the particular act
was an essential part of the conspiracy "must be construed in
favor of the defendants.""'1 31 Thus, if the trial judge cannot, with
certainty, determine which, if any, facts alleged in the indictment
were "essential to the conspiracy," he will be limited to determining that only the general fact of conspiracy was decided by
the prior judgment.
While Grunstein and its companion cases dealt with the conclusive effect of judgments entered on guilty pleas in subsequent
litigation, the more specific problem of the prima facie "estoppel"
effect of such judgments under Section 5 (a) has been the subject
of extensive analysis in a recent series of private treble damage
actions arising out of the Electrical Equipment Industry criminal cases in 1960182 In each of these cases, the trial judge struggled with interpreting the evidentiary effect and use to be given
the prior criminal judgment entered on a guilty plea.'3 3 In each,
the trial judge concluded only that the defendants had at some
specific time conspired to violate the antitrust laws, the minimum
evidentiary effect which could be given under Section 5 (a).
In Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,3 4 the plaintiffs, in commencing their case, were allowed to
read to the jury the paragraph of the criminal indictment alleging a general conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The judge then advised the jury of the defendant's plea of

guilty to the indictment, of the judgment entered thereon, and of
the effect of this judgment as prima facie evidence. 135
closing instructions to the jury, the judge reiterated:

In his

180 127 F. Supp. at 911; see note 124, supra.

In United States v. American Packing Corp.,
'3' 127 F. Supp. at 912.
113 F. Supp. 223, 225 (D.N.J. 1953) the court set down a general rule:
In matters affecting criminality, not only statutes but also pleas of
guilty must be construed strictly and must be limited to the narrowest
confines consistent with an intelligent interpretation of the effect
thereof.
132 E.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 5
TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.)
71123 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See also N. W.
Electric Power Cooperative. v. Maloney Electric Co., Civil No. 13290-3
(W.D. Mo. 1964); City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
Civil No. 348-62 (D.D.C. 1964), unpublished decisions, as reported in Seamons, Winston and McCartney, Use of Criminal Pleas in Aid of Private
Antitrust Actions, 3 DuQ. 167 (1964-65).
133 Id. for a detailed discussion of each trial judge's handling of the admissibility of the prior criminal indictment and judgment as evidence in these
cases.
134 5

TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.)

71123 (E.D. Pa. 1964).

The Supreme Court, in the Emich case, at 572, recognized that it
is within the discretion of the trial judge to control the order of the proof
at trial, i.e., when the prior judgment will be admitted as evidence, and approved the explanation of the judgment to the jury in a preliminary in135
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• . . [that the judgment on the] plea of guilty is prima facie evidence that the Defendants did at some time at least between 1956
and 1960 conspire to violate the antitrust act in respect to power
transformers. . . . It is not evidence of the fact that the plaintiffs
have been damaged. . . . It is not evidence of the amount of any
damage. It is not evidence that the conspiracy had any effect on
prices.136

In another of these cases, N.W. Electric Power Cooperative
V. Maloney Electric Co., 187 the defendants, in a pre-trial confer-

ence report, admitted a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman
Act. Based on this admission, the trial judge refused, at the trial,

to admit in evidence the prior judgment of conviction, the indictment, and the plea of guilty," 8 for the reason that the pre-trial
admission obviated any evidentiary benefits which could be de-

rived from the judgment or plea under Section 5(a).

Signi-

ficantly, the judge noted that "the plea of guilty does not admit
anything more than the commission of an offense and the commission of acts.. . the minimum acts which would be necessary to
constitute an offense. The offense is already admitted."'1 9 The
struction, as was done by the trial judge in PhiladelphiaElectric, in "interests of clarity". Emich at 572.
In fact, it may always be desirable for the trial judge to explain the
scope of the prior judgment when it is first introduced. The advantages in
so doing are, first, that the plaintiff is informed of the extent to which
he may rely on the prior judgment, or conversely, the extent to which
he must adduce independent evidence to prove his prima facie case, cf.
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488, 490 (S.D. N.Y. 1963)
(judgment construed earlier in case, prior to discovery-deposition), and
secondly, that it helps the jury understand and evaluate this independent
evidence as it is received.
136 PhiladelphiaElectric case at 79438. The full text of the final charge
to the jury appears therein.
137 Civil No. 13290-3 (E.D. Mo. 1964), supra note 132.
138 Id. His ruling on these issues was based on the following reasoning:
I have come tentatively to the conclusion that, first, in view of the belated admission of conspiracy, that the judgment of conviction ought not
to be admitted in evidence because it is of lesser force than the admission, both in breadth of time and in its effect ....
Now, the pleas of guilty in respect to the indictment create a different situation. And I am not certain that I am right about this because of the lack of authority in the form of judicial opinion at a higher
level. But I am going to say, first, that unless I am shown some authority which indicates that the plea of guilty to the indictment does
more than admit the minimum facts necessary to constitute the offense,
I am not going to admit the pleas of guilty, and the portions of the
indictment to which they relate. The reason is, that I have tentatively
decided that the plea of guilty does not admit anything more than the
commission of an offense and the commission of acts, the minimum acts
which would be necessary to constitute an offense. The offense is already admitted.
Second, and independently ....

I feel that the possible misuse of

this by the jury, so greatly overweighs any probative effect that it might
have that it ought not to be submitted to the jury.
Record, pp. 2764-65.
13 Id. On admissibility of guilty pleas in subsequent litigation, see
authorities cited, note 49, supra. Under the common law rules of evidence,
it is not the judgment which becomes admissible, as under Section 5(a), but
the plea of guilty to the charge. Race v. Chappell, 304 Ky. 788, 202 S.W. 2d
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implication from this statement is that, if the judge in Maloney
had to directly rule on the evidentiary scope of the prior conviction, he would have agreed with the other trial judges in these

cases, that the prior judgments entered on guilty pleas constituted prima facie evidence only of the existence of a general con140
spiracy, and of the participation therein by the defendants.

The strict test employed in these cases to ascertain what issues were determined by the prior criminal judgment appears to
diverge from the liberal test of "essentiality" applied in Emich.

It is true that, in Emich, the prior criminal judgment was entered
on a jury verdict of guilty, while in these electrical cases, the
judgments followed pleas of guilty. Nevertheless, the same overriding policy consideration of 5(a), to aid the injured private
party, should be operative in either situation.
However, these cases are reconcilable with the Emich decision in that judgments entered on guilty pleas necessarily in-

volve the policy of encouraging capitulation. While the inclusion
of judgments entered on pleas of guilty within the prima facie
rule of 5 (a) is premised upon the dominance of the policy favoring the private suitor, over the policy of encouraging capitulation,
there is no necessity to completely abandon the capitulation policy

with respect to such pleas.

Perhaps, by applying a narrow "es-

sentiality" test to judgments entered on guilty pleas, a defendant
might still find some inducement to capitulate, if his exposure to

liability under the prima facie rule would be less than if he
pleaded not guilty. 14'1 His prima facie liability would thus be
626 (1947). In spite of this distinction, there would seem to be a substantial parallel between the evidentiary effects of a plea of guilty in subsequent
litigation under common law rules and the judgment on the plea under
Section 5 (a). The courts have held that under the common law rules of evidence, a plea of guilty admits only the essential elements, e.g., Adkins v.
United States, 298 F. 2d 842 (8th Cir. 1962), or, in the language of some
courts, the material facts, e.g., Hawley v. Hunter, 161 F. 2d 825 (10th Cir.
1947), charged in the indictment. Thus, the recent cases relating to the admissibility of guilty pleas under the common law rules of evidence do not
shed light with respect to construing the "prima facie scope" problem under
Section 5(a) since these courts, themselves, struggle with the same issue of
defining "essentiality."
140 Accord, City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civil
No. 348-62 (D.D.C. 1964), supra, note 132.
141 In excluding the prior judgment of conviction and the accompanying
guilty plea, the judge in N. W. Electric Power Cooperative v. Maloney Electric Co., Civil No. 13290-3 (W.D. Mo. 1964), supra, note 132, added:
...[T]o serve the policy of the antitrust laws I want to encourage the entry of pleas of guilty in criminal cases without a consideration by the
defendant of the effects of that plea in civil cases other then (sic) the
prima facie showing which is provided for by statute.
Record p 2765. Congress has recently considered what could be an additional fegislative inducement to pleading guilty in S. 2512, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965). In this bill, Senator Hart proposed giving conclusive effect
to judgments entered after trial. However, if the defendant capitulates before trial the judgment carries prima facie weight as under the current
Section 5(a). In addition, he proposed giving prima facie effect to all criminal pleas, nolo and guilty.
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limited to the minimum statutory elements of the violation. Mo±'eover, Emich may be further reconciled in that the expanded record, including a full trial of the facts engendered by the plea of
not guilty, enabled a feasible application of a liberal "essentiality"
test to determine the underlying specific findings necessary to
support the ultimate finding of conspiracy. 142 While in the cases
where the judgment was entered on a plea of guilty without any
presentation of evidence, the judgment was not as probative of
the facts, and rendered application of a liberal "essentiality"
test impractical.
A realistic approach to the problem of the evidentiary effect
to be accorded a prior criminal judgment must also recognize
the extrajudicial benefit accruing to the private suitor by the
mere admission, alone, of the prior conviction:' He' benefits from
the prejudicial influence on the jury gained from their awareness
of the defendants prior conviction. It is well accepted that the
jurors are apt to givegreat weight to such evidence. 143 This lends
further support to the Electrical cases view that the. evidentiary
impact of the prior conviction on pleas of guilty, under Section
5 (a), should be minimized to mitigate the prejudicial effects of
the admission. Even with a narrow construction of the evidentiary benefits available under Section 5 (a), combining this
admission with the extrajudicial benefit available to the private
suitor once the prior judgment entered on the guilty plea is
merely admitted, in fact, if not in legal theory, shifts the moral
burden of guilt entirely to the defendant.
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that the issues
available to the private suitor in a subsequent treble damage
action, as prima facie evidence, should be limited to the minimum
statutory elements of the violation charged in the indictment.
This conclusion gains further support by a reexamination of the
dual policy considerations involved in the enforcement ,of the
antitrust laws. The various circuits' determination that judgments entered on pleas of guilty were not "consent judgments or
decrees" within the scope of the exclusionary proviso and therefore admissible in subsequent litigation, favored the policy of aiding private parties at the expense of the policy of inducing capitulation. 4 4 The effect of these holdings was to discourage capitulation through a plea of guilty, since it subjected these defendants
142 See text at note 122, supra.
143 Krulewitch v. United -States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).

"The naive as-

sumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instruction to the jury
all practicing lawyers know to be an unmitigated fiction." Id. at 453.
144 See text at notes 57-60, supra.
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to the evidentiary burdens of Section 5 (a) as if they had litigated
and lost. However, if the prima facie scope of the prior judgment is narrowly defined, it may still be enough of an inducement
to the defendant to capitulate by pleading guilty in the criminal
action, since the evidentiary benefits accruing to the private suitor
would be minimized 14 5 and the burden and expense of defending
a long criminal suit would be eliminated. Utilizing this approach,
the government perpetuates the primary purpose of Section 5 (a),
to aid injured private suitors, yet accomplishes its goal of effective, efficient enforcement, without trial.
David Schenk

145 The Supreme Court has suggested that the prima facie rule of Sec-

tion 5(a) may often be a.benefit of limited practical value.

Cf. Minnesota

Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 319
(1965). See Notes, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1400, 1407 (1952),,61 YALE L. J. 417,
424, 425 (1952).
Moreover, it has been suggested that the plaintiff may,

practically, have to relitigate even the basic issue of conspiracy to get the
true impact of the violation across to the jury, especially when the defendant
introduces contradictory evidence to explain away his plea of guilty.

at 425.

Id.

